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THE WEST VIRGINIA DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
STANL=Y E. DADmA--N*
T,-. West Virginia dead man's statute provides:
"No person offered as a witness in any civil action, suit or
proceeding, shall be excluded by reason of his interest in the
event of the action, suit or proceeding, or because he is a party
thereto, except as follows: No party to any action, suit or pro-
ceeding, nor any person interested in the event thereof, nor any
person from, through or under whom any such party or inter-
ested person derives any interest or title by assignment or other-
wise, shall be examined as a witness in regard to any personal
transaction or communication between such witness and a per-
son at the time of such examination, deceased, insane or lunatic,
against the executor, administrator, heir-at-law, next of kin,
assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of such person, or the as-
signee or committee of such insane person or lunatic. But this
prohibition shall not extend to any transaction or communica-
tion as to which any such executor, administrator, heir-at-law,
next of kin, assignee, le .atee. devisee. survivor or committee shall
be examined on his own behalf, nor as to which the testimony
of such deceased person or lunatic shall be given in evidence:
Provided, however, that where an action is brought for causing
the death of any person by any wrongful act, neglect or default
under article seven, chapter fifty-five of this code, the person
sued, or the servant, agent or employee of any firm or corpora-
tion sued, shall have the right to give evidence in any case in
which he or it is sued, but he may not give evidence of any
conversation with the deceased."I
This statute warrants reappraisal because of its age if for no
other reason. It is a venerable statute, dating back to the early years
of the state, and has sturdily survived with but minor amendments.
While age alone does not ordinarily impair the quality and utility
of a statute, this particular one has its roots planted deep in history
and yet is invoked and applied, vigorously and decisively, in current
litigation of types, to an extent and with results perhaps not contem-
plated by the original draftsmen. Accordingly, a brief examination
of its history, current status and applications, and future usefulness
may well be timely.
0 Professor of Law. West Virginia University.
1W. VA. CODE c. 57, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1955).
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HMsToRY OF THE DFk) MAN'S STATE
Early common law rules disqualified many persons as witnesses,
particularly parties to litigation and others interested therein. These
rules were developed because of historical reasons, during the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries.2 However, by the middle of the
nineteenth century, changed conditions, circumstances and thinking
prompted England's statutory abandonment of many of the rules.
For example, Lord Denman's Act in 1848 began with the recital,
"Whereas the inquiry after truth in courts of justice is often ob-
structed by incapacities created by the present law, and it is de-
sirable that full information as to the facts in issue, both in criminal
and in civil cases, should be laid before the persons who are ap-
pointed to decide upon them, and that such persons should exer-
cise their judgment on the credit of the witnesses adduced and on
the truth of their testimony."3 Eight years later, in 1851, "an act
to amend the law of evidence" provided:
"II. On the trial of any issue joined, or of any matter or
question, or on any inquiry arising in any suit, action, or other
proceeding in any court of justice, or before any person having
by law, or by consent of parties, authority to hear, receive, and
examine evidence, the parties thereto, and the persons in whose
behalf any such suit, action, or other proceeding may be
brought or defended, shall, except as herein-after excepted, be
competent and compellable to give evidence, either viva voce
or by deposition, according to the practice of the court, on be-
half of either or any of the parties to the said suit, action, or
other proceeding."4
The exception mentioned in the act is not pertinent herein. It
will be noted that England, by the two acts quoted and others,
swept away generally the disqualification rules. Equally significant
is the fact that England did not, at the time or later, enact dead
man's statutes prohibiting survivors from testifying as to communica-
tions or transactions with persons since deceased.
The story, however, is different in the United States. About
and after the middle of the nineteenth century the several states
generally abandoned many of the rules disqualifying witnesses,
including those who were parties to litigation and others interested
therein, but proceeded to enact dead man's statutes for the ostensible
2 2 WMoRE, EVmENCE §§ 575-578 (3d ed. 1940).
36 & 7 VICT. c. 85 (1843).
-114 & 15 Vicr. c. 99 (1851).
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purpose of protecting estates of decedents.5 The enactments were
obviously compromise measures without known precedent, but they
quickly and firmly took root in a great majority of the states. Judge
Alpheus F. Haymond, speaking for the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia in 1878, explained that "the intention of the law
in the exception to the privilege to testify was intended to prevent
an undue advantage on the part of the living over the dead, who
cannot confront the survivor, or give his version of the affair, or
expose the omission, mistakes or perhaps falsehoods of such sur-
vivor. The temptation to falsehood and concealment in such cases
is considered too great, to allow the surviving party to testify in
his own behalf. Any other view of this subject, I think would place
in great peril the estates of the dead, and would in fact make them
an easy prey for the dishonest and unscrupulous, which with due
deference to the views and opinions of others, it seems to me, the
Legislature never intended."6 Many practitioners who have had
experience in handling litigation involving estates of deceased per-
sons will affirm every word Judge Haymond so stated many years
ago.
For present purposes, simply stated, the West Virginia statute
denies a "party to any action, suit or proceeding" and "any person
interested in the event thereof" the right or privilege to "be examined
as a witness in regard to any personal transaction or communica-
tion between such witness and a person at the time of such examina-
tion, deceased... ."7 The next sentence of the statute limits this
prohibition and will permit the party or other interested person to
testify concerning any transaction or communication on which the
executor, administrator and other named parties have been examined
in their own behalf or relating to which the testimony of the de-
ceased person shall have been given in evidence. Little change has
been made legislatively in these provisions of the law, although
judicial construction and application of the language manifest
change. The proviso at the end of the section was amended ma-
terially in 1937. Prior to that time the proviso was limited to phy-
sicians in the following language:
"Provided, however, that where an action is brought for
causing the death of any person by a wrongful act, neglect or
default under article seven, chapter fifty-five of this Code, the
52 WIGMoE, EVIDENCE § 578.
6 Owens v. Owens's Adm'r, 14 W. Va. 88, 95 (1878).
7 W. VA. CODE C. 57, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1955).
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physician sued shall have the right to give evidence in any
case in which he is sued; but in this event he can only give
evidence as to the medicine or treatment given to the deceased,
but he cannot give evidence of any conversation had with the
deceased."8
Prior to the amendment the physician proviso had remained un-
changed for forty years.
The statute has been many times applied, interpreted and con-
strued in the long course of its history, as manifested by the numer-
ous decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals relating thereto. In
view of the minor amendments of the law and the absence of at-
tacks thereon, it may be concluded that the bench and bar, the
members of the legislature, and citizens generally are content and
satisfied with the statute in its present language and applica-
tion. However, criticisms of the statute are heard from time to time,
suggestions of legislative changes have been made,9 and the courts
have found some difficulty in applying and construing the lan-
guage in particular cases. For example in 1934 the Supreme
Court of Appeals divided three to two on the meaning of the lan-
guage, with Judge M. 0. Litz observing in the majority opinion:
"... Whatever may be our views on the policy of the
West Virginia statute as interpreted herein, we believe the
change, if any, should be made by the Legislature."10
The court, as early as 1876, in tracing the history of the statute
back to New York laws from which the West Virginia draft is sup-
posed to have been copied, suggested the desirability of clarifying
amendments.11
Cuim=ET STATUS OF THE DAD MAN's STATUTE
Across the country many spoken and written condemnations
of these statutes are noted. The suggestions for change do not
appear to bear fruit quickly. The apparent complacency, above
mentioned in West Virginia, may be manifest throughout the coun-
try. Lawyers may be more concerned with substantive law and
less receptive of changes in procedural matters. In any event it
may be observed that no marked abandonment of the dead man's
statutes is indicated in the several states.
8W. VA. Rsv. COD. c. 57, art. 3, § 1 (1981); W. Va. Acts 1937, c. 67.
9 See 39 W. VA. L.Q. 174 (1933); 41 W. VA. L.Q. 256 (1935).
10 Strode v. Dyer, 115 W. Va. 733, 739, 177 S.E. 878, 881 (1934).
11 Metz's Adm'r v. Snodgrass, 9 W. Va. 190, 194 (1876).
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In Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration, edited by
Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt in 1949, the results of a survey
of the admissibility of the survivor's testimony in the various states
are graphically presented on a map of the United States. 12 Six
states, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode
Island and South Dakota, are there shown to admit freely the
testimony of the survivor. At the other extreme, five states, Iowa,
Mississippi, Missouri, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, are labeled
in black with the legend, "Survivor's testimony absolutely pro-
hibited." Three states, Arizona, Montana and New Hampshire,
leave admissibility in the discretion of the court. New Mexico
and Virginia admit survivor's testimony but require corroboration.
The status of the statute in the other states may be summarized by
saying that, with the consent of or implied waiver by the personal
representative, a survivor's testimony may be admitted as to trans-
actions with the deceased. An examination of statutes and decisions
show few material changes in the nine years since the edited survey.
Before looking more minutely into the status and applications
of the West Virginia statute, it may be well to examine briefly pro-
visions of the statutes of neighboring states on the borders of West
Virginia.
Kentucky's 1952 revision of her dead man's statute is somewhat
comprehensive and includes many provisions not immediately per-
tinent herein. The statute provides that no person shall testify for
himself concerning any verbal statement of, or any transaction with,
or any act done or omitted to be done by one who is dead when
the testimony is offered, "except in actions for personal injury,
death or damage to property by negligence or tortious acts, unless:
"(c) The decedent, or a representative of, or someone
interested in, his estate, shall have testified against such per-
son, with reference thereto ...
A later subsection provides:
"(5) If the right of a person to testify for himself be
founded upon the fact that one who is dead or of unsound
mind has testified against him, the testimony of such person
shall be confined to the facts or transactions to which the ad-
verse testimony related."13
12 VANDEar, MnmmM STANDARDS OF JuDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 834-
341 (1949).
13 Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Baldwin 1955).
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In Maryland, in actions or proceedings by or against estates of
decedents, no party to the cause "shall be allowed to testify as to
any transaction had with, or statement made by" the decedent
"unless called to testify by the opposite party, or unless the testi-
mony" of such decedent shall have already been given in evidence
"concerning the same transaction or statement, in the same
cause ... ."14
In Ohio an adverse party may testify in proceedings involving
a decedents estate
"2. When the action or proceeding relates to a contract
made through an agent by a person since deceased, and the
agent is competent to testify as a witness ...,
but such adverse party's testimony will be limited to the subject
of the agent's testimony. Three other provisions are pertinent:
"3. If a party, or one having a direct interest, testifies to
transactions or conversations with another party, the latter
may testify as to the same transactions or conversations;
"4. If a party offers evidence of conversations or admis-
sions of the opposite party, the latter may testify concerning
the same conversations or admissions;
"7. If after testifying orally, a party dies, the evidence
may be proved by either party on a further trial of the case,
whereupon the opposite party may testify to the same
matters. .. "15
The Pennsylvania statute provides that, "where any party to a
thing or contract in action is dead," the surviving or remaining
party "to such thing or contract, or any other person whose interest
shall be adverse to the said right of such deceased," shall be incom-
petent as a witness "to any matter occurring before the death of
said party," with certain exceptions not here immediately pertinent.' 6
One section of the Virginia statute provides that "No person
shall be incompetent to testify because of interest, or because of
his being a party to any action, suit, or proceeding of a civil
nature.. . -"7 Another section provides:
14 MD. ANN. CODE art 35, § 3 (Michie 1957).
15 Omo GEN. CODE ANN. § 11495 (Anderson 1938).1 6 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 322 (1930).
17 VA. CODE § 8-285 (Michie 1950).
6
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"In an action or suit by or against a person who, from any
cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or against the committee,
trustee, executor, administrator, heir, or other representative
of the person so incapable of testifying, no judgment or decree
shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party
founded on his uncorroborated testimony; and in any such
action or suit, if such adverse party testifies, all entries,
memoranda, and declarations by the party so incapable of
testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter
in issue, may be received as evidence."18
It will be recalled that the above referenced survey, edited by
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, 19 indicated that Virginia admitted a sur-
vivor's testimony but required corroboration; that Kentucky, Mary-
land and Ohio admitted a survivor's testimony with the consent of
or implied waiver by the personal representative of decedent; and
that Pennsylvania and West Virginia were among the five states
wherein a survivor's testimony was "absolutely prohibited."'
Simply stated, the statutes of Kentucky, Maryland and Ohio
admit a survivor's testimony concerning transactions with the de-
cedent in cases wherein the adverse party representing decedents
estate has already introduced in evidence testimony relating to said
transactions. The Virginia statute simply provides that a survivor
shall be a competent witness, regardless of interest or party status,
but his testimony must be corroborated and, if he testifies, the de-
cedent's pertinent and relevant conversations and documents may
be received as evidence.
Without extending a discussion of the Pennsylvania dead
man's statute, it may be noted that the incompetency of a witness
under provisions of the statute may be waived and his testimony
may be accorded probative value. '
Under the West Virginia dead man's statute, is the survivor's
testimony "absolutely prohibited"?
Reference to a few cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Appeals will serve to answer this question. In Ogdin v. First
National Bank2' the court observed that the disqualification of a
witness under provisions of the statute may be waived and the
testimony of the witness is competent. In Painter v. Long the
court held:
18 Id. § 8-286.
19 Note 12 supra.20 In re Romig's Estate, 172 Pa. Super. 384, 98 A.2d 884 (1953).
21 108 W. Va. 665, 138 S.E. 376 (1927).
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"In an action by an administrator for the recovery of assets
on behalf of the decedent's estate, if the widow testifies to per-
sonal transactions and communications between the defendant
and the decedent, the defendant may as a witness in his own
behalf speak fully of the same."22
In Willhide v. Biggs the court divided three to two on one phase
of the case but was unanimous in holding, with reference to provi-
sions of the dead man's statute, that
"The competence of a witness to give material testimony
may not be challenged for the first time in this court, but must
be raised and passed upon in the trial court before it can be
made the basis of an assignment of error here ... "23
This same rule of law was applied in the more recent case of
Mann v. Peck24 wherein the court considers the testimony of a wit-
ness when no question as to his incompetency under the dead
man's statute was raised in the trial court. From these and other
decisions it may be convincingly deduced that a survivor's testi-
mony under the West Virginia statute is not "absolutely prohibited."
Moreover, by court construction and application, results accom-
plished and accomplishable under the West Virginia statute may
compare favorably with results under the statutes of Kentucky,
Maryland and Ohio in which jurisdictions a survivor's testimony
is admitted on the basis of consent of or implied waiver by the repre-
sentative of decedent's estate.
A few cases will illustrate limits defined by the court in cir-
cumscribing admissibility of testimony under the statute. In
Strode v. Dyer25 the court held that the "phrase, 'personal transac-
tion or communication,' as used in Code 1931, 57-3-1, includes
transactions involving negligent injury." A strong dissent pointed
out:
"A man, alone, is carefully and lawfully driving his auto-
mobile on a highway when another automobile carrying a
group of drunken rowdies collides with his. One of them is
killed and his personal representative sues the lone driver. The
survivors in the hoodlum car may all testify; the solitary driver
may not. Where is the justice of such an absurd result? Why
place a law-abiding person at such an extreme disadvantage?
22 69 W. Va. 765, 766, 74 S.E. 953 (1911).
23 118 W. Va. 160, 188 S.E. 876 (1936).
24 139 W. Va. 487, 80 S.E.2d 518 (1954).
25 115 W. Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934).
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The statute does not create any such consequence; it comes
from judicial construction."28
The court, in Clark v. Douglas,27 was later confronted with a factual
situation somewhat comparable in principle to the illustration pre-
sented in the dissent and squarely held that the survivor's testimony
as to the tort committed by decedent was not admissible.
In In re Hauer's Estate2 8 it was held that a claimant, in pro-
ceedings before a commissioner of accounts for settlement of an
estate, was incompetent to testify as to the contents of a written
agreement with the deceased made some years prior to decedent's
death and apparently lost in a flood. In Mann v. Peck29 no objec-
tion was interposed in the trial court as to a claimant's testimony
relating to the execution of two notes by decedent, but the Supreme
Court of Appeals indicated that, had proper objection been made,
the testimony would have been inadmissible under the statute.
Kuhn v. Shreeve3° holds that "the spouse of an interested party
will not be examined as a witness relative to a personal transac-
tion or communication theretofore had with a person deceased,
insane or lunatic at the time of his examination" and further holds
that:
"A witness who is incompetent to testify by reason of
being the spouse of an interested party is likewise incompetent
as a witness for a coparty who is equally interested."
FVTuRE OF THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTr
"The current of intelligent commentary has been running
strongly against maintenance of dead man statutes." So states a
1957 text prepared by eminent scholars in the field of evidence.31
Professor Wigmore observed in his treatise:
"As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now
discarded interest-qualification is deplorable in every respect;
for it is based on a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads
to as much or more false decision than it prevents, and it
encumbers the profession with a profuse mass of barren
quibbles over the interpretation of mere words."
82
26 Id. at 789, 177 S.E. at 882.
27 189 W. Va. 691, 81 S.E.2d 112 (1954).
28 135 W. Va. 488, 68 S.E.2d 853 (1951).
29 189 W. Va. 487, 80 S.E.2d 518 (1954).
30 89 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1955).
3 1 MORGAN, MAGUIRE, WENSTEIN, CASES AM1 MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE
181 (1957).
32 2 WI GmoRE, EVIDENCE § 578.
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He posed the question: "Can it be more important to save dead
men's estates from false claims than to save living men's estates
from loss by lack of proof?" Professor McCormick points out that,
"Most commentators agree that here again the expedient
of refusing altogether to listen to the survivor is, in the words
of Bentham, a 'blind and brainless' technique. In seeking to
avoid injustice on one side, the statute-makers have ignored
the equal possibility of injustice on the other. The temptation
to the survivor to fabricate a claim or defense is obvious enough,
so obvious indeed that any jury will realize that his story must
be cautiously heard. A searching cross-examination will usual-
ly, in case of fraud, reveal discrepancies in the 'tangled web'
of deception. .. ."8
In 1938 the American Bar Association's Committee on Im-
provements in the Law of Evidence referred to the dead man's
statute as "an anachronism and an obstruction to truth" and recom-
mended the Connecticut statute as a model basis for change.34 The
Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund of New
York, a committee composed of eminent scholars and practitioners,
reported in 1927 that the dead man's statutes were obstructions to
truth and recommended the Connecticut statute as a basis for legis-
lation in other states.35 In Minimum Standards of Judicial Ad-
ministration, edited by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, it was recom-
mended
"That the rule excluding testimony of an interested party
as to transactions with deceased persons, should be abrogated
by the adoption of a statute like that of Connecticut, which
removes the disqualification of the party as a witness and
ermits the introduction of declarations of the decedent, on a
g by the trial judge that they were made in good faith
and on decedents personal knowledge."36
The rules of evidence have been developed as a basis for ascer-
tainment of truth in judicial proceedings. This was emphasized by
Mr. Justice Sutherland, in Funk v. United States, when he wrote:
"The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence
must rest-if they are to rest upon reason-is their adaptation
to the successful development of truth. And since experience
is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience
33 McCoRMcK, HANDBOOr OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 65 (1954).
3436 A.B.A. REP. 581 (1938).
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is a continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at
one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should
yield to the experience of a succeeding generation whenever
that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or un-
wisdom of the old rule."3 7
At another point in the opinion he wrote:
"... Whatever was the danger that an interested wit-
ness would not speak the truth-and the danger never was as
great as claimed-its effect has been minimized almost to a
vanishing point by the test of cross-examination, the increased
intelligence of jurors, and perhaps other circumstances...." 3 8
Professor Wigmore would obviously concur as to the efficacy of
cross-examination in view of his expressed opinion that "it is be-
yond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth."3 9
The objects and shortcomings of the dead man's statutes are
well pointed out by Professor Morgan when he says:
"All are based upon the delusion that perjury can be pre-
vented by making interested persons incompetent or by exclud-
ing certain classes of testimony. They persist in spite of experi-
ence which demonstrates that they defeat the honest litigant
and rarely, if ever, prevent the dishonest from introducing the
desired evidence: if the dishonest party is prevented from com-
mitting perjury, he is not prevented from suborning it. If the
statutes protect the estates of the dead from some false claims,
they damage the estates of the living to a much greater ex-
tent. And frequently their application prevents proof of a valid
claim by the representative of decedent's estate."4 0
When the history of the statute is understood, when its applica-
tion has been found to be impractical, when commentary and sur-
vey findings point out its weaknesses and demerits, and when cura-
tive and remedial legislation in other jurisdictions has been tried,
tested and found to be satisfactory, the question may be pondered
why the statute is so firmly rooted and so stubbornly retained.
Several possible positions may be suggested for West Virginia.
1. The present statute41 may be continued without amend-
ment, in which event the courts will be called upon from time to
37290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
38 Id. at 380.
39 5 WIGMOBE, EvIDENcE § 1367.40 MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMEICAN
SYSTEm OF L1TIGATION 187-188 (1956).
41W. VA. CODE c. 57, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1955).
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time to shape and fashion the law in the borderlands of difficult
cases.
2. The statute may be amended by striking out all of the sec-
tion except the first part of the first sentence so that the amended
enactment would read as follows:
"No person offered as a witness in any civil action, suit
or proceeding, shall be excluded by reason of his interest in
the event of the action, suit or proceeding, or because he
is a party thereto."
This simple declaration would positively remove the question of
common law disqualification because of interest. Some additions
to the simply stated statute may be desirable. For example, to
borrow from a Connecticut statute, the section might further state
that the interest of such witness "may be shown for the purpose of
affecting his credit."42 It will be noted that the present West Vir-
ginia statute has several prongs or tangents. Not to be minimized
in importance is the question of admissibility of written and oral
statements of the deceased in litigation involving such decedent's
estate. The Commonwealth Fund suggestion,43 heretofore men-
tioned and endorsed by the superior legal talent of the country,
may be considered and adopted as an answer to this question and
others arising incident to the statute. That suggestion is in the
following language:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any ac-
tion, suit or proceeding by reason of his interest in the event
of the same as a party or otherwise.
"In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the repre-
sentatives of deceased persons, including proceedings for the
probate of wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral
or written, shall not be excluded as hearsay provided that the
trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was
made by decedent, and that it was in good faith and on de-
cedent's personal knowledge."
It may be found acceptable to substitute this suggestion in toto
for the present West Virginia statute.
3. West Virginia may find the Virginia statute acceptable in
form and content. It follows generally the pattern of the New
42 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7868 (1949).
43 86 A.B.A. REP. 581 (1938).
12
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Mexico statute44 and has commendable features. Two immediately
pertinent sections thereof provide:
"No person shall be incompetent to testify because of
interest, or because of his being a party to any action, suit,
or proceeding of a civil nature; but he shall, if otherwise com-
petent to testify, and subject to the rules of evidence and prac-
tice applicable to other witnesses, be competent to give evi-
dence in his own behalf and be competent and compellable to
attend and give evidence on behalf of any other party to such
action, suit, or proceeding; but in any case at law, the court,
for good cause shown, may require any such person to attend
and testify ore tenus and, upon his failure to so attend and
testify, may exclude his deposition." 45
"In an action or suit by or against a person, who, from
any cause, is incapable of testifying, or by or against the com-
mittee, trustee, executor, administrator, heir, or other repre-
sentative of the person so incapable of testifying, no judgment
or decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested
party founded on his uncorroborated testimony; and in any such
action or suit, if such adverse party testifies, all entries,
memoranda, and declarations of the party so incapable of
testifying made while he was capable, relevant to the matter
in issue, may be received in evidence."46
The Code of Laws of the District of Columbia,47 as amended
by Congress in 1948, contains similar provisions relating to a sur-
vivor's testimony. In Virginia and the District of Columbia, the
corroborative evidence required by the statutes need not be of
itself sufficient to support a judgment. As Circuit Judge Edgerton
expressed it,
"... We think the statute permits a judgment based es-
sentially on the survivor's testimony if there is other evidence
from which reasonable men might conclude that his testi-
mony is probably true. . .. "48
4. Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence,49 drafted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
provides that, except as otherwise restricted by the Rules, "all
relevant evidence is admissible." Rule 8 provides that the judge
44 N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 20, art. 1, § § 6-8 (1953).4 5 VA. CODE § 8-285 (Michie 1950).
46 Id. § 8-286.
47 D.C. CODE AN. tit 14, § 302 (1951).
48 Rosinski v. Whiteford, 87 App. D.C. 313, 184 F.2d 700, 701, 21
A.L.R.2d 1009 (1950).
49 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1953), were approved by the American
Bar Association at its meeting in Boston, Massachusetts, August 28, 1953.
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shall pass upon the qualifications of a witness and the admissibility
of his testimony. Under Rule 17 the judge may disqualify a person
to be a witness if he finds "the proposed witness is incapable of
understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth." If desired,
a proposed substitute for the West Virginia dead man's statute may
be drafted upon a basis of the principles and provisions of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence.
5. In view of the construction and application of the present
dead man's statute, as reflected in opinions of the Supreme Court
of Appeals, it seems little would be gained by West Virginia's
adoption of the language and provisions of the statutes of Ken-
tucky, Maryland and Ohio, as heretofore mentioned.
Adoption of the proposed Rules of Civil Procedure50 for West
Virginia, including a rule comparable to Rule 48 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, will not remove the limitations and
prohibitions of the West Virginia dead man's statute.5 1 In Wright v.
Wilson,52 involving a motor vehicle accident in Pennsylvania,
Circuit Judge Goodrich was obliged to apply the Pennsylvania
dead man's statute in federal court litigation. He reviewed the
history of the statute and, in ruling that the proffered testimony of a
survivor was inadmissible, observed that "whatever door one tries
it is firmly locked against the admissibility." He reached this
"result without enthusiasm" but did not consider it proper to
remedy the situation by judicial legislation.
It is hoped that this brief reappraisal of the dead man's statute
in West Virginia will serve in some measure to focus attention of
the bench and bar, members of the legislature, and citizens gen-
erally on its provisions and application. To some, the existing
statute may be found entirely satisfactory. To others, it may be
weighed and found wanting. As an eminent jurist once wrote,
"In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant
rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of whatever is pure
and sound and fine."
58
50 The proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for West Virginia, patterned
largely on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, were approved by a vote of
The West Virginia State Bar in 1957, but adoption and promulgation of the
Rules are within the province of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
51 See Hayes v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 450 (N.D.W. Va. 1955).
52 154 F.2d 616, 619-620 (2d Cir. 1946).
53 CArozo, Tim NAT oRE OF THE JuDimCL ProcEss 179 (1921).
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